Developing for Peace: An Analysis of Charles A. Lindbergh’s Views on American Foreign Policy

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On May 21, 1927, America gained a new hero, in the person of 25-year old air mail and National Guard pilot Charles A. Lindbergh Jr. On that day, after fighting inclement weather and fatigue-induced hallucinations, Lindbergh landed his airplane, the Spirit of St. Louis, at the Le Bourget Aerodrome in Paris, becoming the first person to fly solo, non-stop across the Atlantic Ocean.¹

In his memoirs, Lindbergh writes that “I had concentrated so intensely on the preparation and execution of the flight that I had thought little about what I would do after landing.”² Without a doubt, he was entirely unprepared for his reception in France, where a crowd of 150,000 people stormed his plane and passed him around above their heads for several minutes before two French pilots distracted the mob by putting Lindbergh’s helmet on the head of an American reporter, thereby allowing Lindbergh to be whisked away.³ He was equally unprepared for the reaction in America, where the public excitement was so great that President Calvin Coolidge effectively forced Lindbergh to cut short his European travels to return stateside on board a specially-commissioned Navy warship. In so doing, the White House sought to upstage competing

³ A. Scott Berg, Lindbergh: 129.
political interests, all of which sought to make Lindbergh their guest of honour in lavish public celebrations, so as to capitalize on his popularity.\(^4\)

After the trans-Atlantic voyage, Lindbergh “was, throughout the world, not merely the hero of the day, but of the era.”\(^5\) He had the opportunity to amass incredible fortune and prestige as an actor, lecturer, or politician to name but a few of the career paths offered to him.\(^6\) However, he chose to remain a pilot, travelling to every state in the Union, as well as to Canada, Mexico and the Caribbean during 1927, and to China, India, and numerous other locations over the next few years.\(^7\)

By choosing to remain a travelling pilot, with access to diverse cultures and influential public figures, Lindbergh had the privileged opportunity of observing, in person, international events and relations. From the late 1920s, through to the outbreak of World War II, Lindbergh became increasingly interested in American foreign policy. While his opinions regarding international affairs were certainly pro-American, by the late 1930s, his ideas and actions increasingly conflicted with those of the administration of President Franklin Roosevelt. The relationship between Lindbergh and Roosevelt became extremely bitter at the start of the Second World War, when Lindbergh lobbied against American involvement in the conflict.\(^8\) His involvement in isolationist activities prompted Roosevelt to compare Lindbergh to Clement Vallandigham, a “Copperhead” Democratic congressman from Ohio who during the Civil War, campaigned in favour of

\(^5\) Ibid, 262.
\(^7\) Ibid.
\(^8\) Probably the most comprehensive source on Lindbergh’s isolationist activities is Wayne Cole, Charles A. Lindbergh and the Battle Against American Intervention in World War II. (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1974).
Union alignment with the Confederacy.  This essay will examine Charles Lindbergh’s views on American foreign policy during the years from the time of his trans-Atlantic flight to the date of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, and will analyse how his view of a world order coincided and conflicted with those of the American governments of his time.

Before examining Lindbergh’s views on foreign policy, it is necessary to understand his overall life goals. In his autobiography, he describes how in 1927, when forced to choose between either making millions by giving up his flying career to focus on other endeavours, or remaining a pilot and earning less money, he opted for the latter choice. The development of aviation technology was always a priority for Lindbergh, and throughout his travels in 1927, he “advocated the construction of airports and the inauguration of air routes.” After ending his touring in the spring of 1928, he accepted positions with Transcontinental Air Transport and with Pan American Airways as a technical advisor and pilot. In this capacity, Lindbergh spent considerable time flying survey routes and had the opportunity to explore further areas of Latin America. While flying in southern Mexico, he worked with American archaeologist Dr. A.V. Kidder, and in a one-week period, “they discovered as many as six lost [Mayan ruins] which might otherwise not have been reached for decades.”

Though it might seem unusual for a pilot to have a keen interest in archaeology, Lindbergh was clearly a man who was curious about many different fields. Describing his work as a technical advisor, he writes:

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11 Ibid.
The establishment of air routes required a great deal of survey flying. The low cruising speeds of that period gave me plenty of time for contemplation between points of take-off and destination. My mind would wander without limit through fields of memory and fantasy, returning at intervals to meet problems of the moment – thereby causing the past, present and future to converge. Emerging from my contemplation were two areas of extraordinary interest. One related to aviation’s progress, the other to the quality and mystery of life.14

Regarding his curiosity about aviation, Lindbergh envisioned the use of rockets for travel in air and space. In the early 1930s, he helped raise funds for scientist Robert Goddard, who sought to develop a rocket capable of reaching high altitudes.15 This interest in rockets continued through to the 1950s, when Lindbergh worked with U.S. Air Force and Defence Department committees which dealt with weapons research and with selecting sites for stationing missiles.16

Lindbergh’s interest in rocketry was also connected to his second main area of interest; namely, the “quality and mystery of life.” He saw rockets as being useful for space travel, a field which spawned an interest in cryogenics, which he saw as useful for long-distance space travel. He began studying “biology, cytology, organic chemistry, and surgery,”17 research which proved useful when he worked with Dr. Alexis Carrel to develop a pump for use in heart operations.18

In short, Lindbergh had a profound interest in technology. However, his curiosity did not end with the world of science. Obviously, one cannot understand the “quality and mystery of life” without examining human cultures and political interactions, and though Lindbergh’s formal post-secondary education consisted of just one year of studies in

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15 A. Scott Berg, Lindbergh: 211.
17 Ibid, 16.
engineering at the University of Wisconsin plus a year of flying school with the U.S. Army, he was more than willing to voice his opinions on a wide variety of issues unrelated to his areas of expertise. It was likely because of his experience as a technician and a scientist that he juxtaposed his attitudes concerning science and technological advancement into the social and political spheres, resulting in a world view which used technological values, such as efficiency, productivity and physical quality, to measure the success of individuals and systems.

A prime example of this attitude is shown in his description of how he chose his wife, to which he refers as his “girl-meeting project.” In his autobiography, he derides the womanizing pilots that he met in his days as a “barnstormer” and as an Army cadet for their “facile” approach to relationships. For Lindbergh, the ideal romance was stable and long-term, with a woman who had good physical health, a keen intellect and strong genes. The latter quality was extremely important for him, and he writes that while working on the “project,” he “was an individual exercising evolutionary choice in a twentieth-century environment, an environment impinging on heredity with greater force than ever before in man’s history because of the sudden flowering of scientific knowledge.” Lindbergh uses technological and biological examples to illustrate his point, saying that the physical qualities he desired in a woman “could be outlined in sequence like the specifications for an airplane,” and that his “experience in breeding animals on our farm had taught me the importance of good heredity.”

20 Ibid, 122.
21 Ibid, 121.
22 Ibid, 120.
23 Ibid, 119.
24 Ibid, 118.
He took a similar approach in his study of nations, arguing that race was a major determinant of national success. In letters to historian Wayne Cole in the early 1970s, he described his concepts of racial superiority, arguing that white people were, in general, intellectually superior to blacks, while the sensate abilities of blacks were superior to those of Caucasians. By the same token, he believed that “certain races have demonstrated superior ability in the design, manufacture and operation of machines.” He further argued that “the growth of our western civilization has been closely related to this superiority.” Obviously, such theories have been discredited by modern science. However, combining the attitudes of many of his contemporaries toward racial superiority with his own technical worldview, Lindbergh came to embrace views which would be considered racist and morally reprehensible by modern standards.

By this logic, the most superior nation would be the one which combined a high degree of technological advancement with an effective social and political system. For Lindbergh, that nation was America. Though he admired specific elements of other nations, such as the “German genius for science and organization, the English genius for government and commerce, [and] the French genius for living and the understanding of life,” he believed that “in America they can be blended to form the greatest genius of all.”

So how did Charles Lindbergh’s personal beliefs translate into a conception of an ideal American foreign policy? The answer to this question must be developed in stages,

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25 The term “nation” is used in an ethnic and a political sense in this paragraph.
26 Cited in Wayne Cole, Charles A. Lindbergh and the Battle Against American Intervention in World War II: 81-82. Cole writes that the nations in question were the “North Americans, British, Germans, Dutch and Swedes.”
27 Ibid, 82.
28 Cited in Ibid.
29 Ibid.
as Lindbergh himself developed his world view. As mentioned earlier, before his trans-Atlantic flight, Lindbergh had few objectives aside from crossing the Atlantic and possibly doing some travelling in Europe. It was after he returned to America that he was forced to decide how he wanted to use his incredible popularity and mobility. He chose to remain a pilot largely because he wanted to develop aviation in the U.S. and around the world. Lindbergh believed that America was the country best suited, culturally and industrially, to spearhead the development of aviation, and writes that:

My short visit to Europe … strengthened my belief that the United States of America offered the greatest opportunity for developing aviation. Our combination of industry and technical skills and our vast space was unequaled by any other country: forty-eight states teaching the same language without a customs border between them; two and a half thousand miles from east to west, more than a thousand miles north to south, under the regulation of a single national government; around a hundred and twenty million people working together in a political system that was also an economic system.30

Realizing that the development of air travel had been “crystallized”31 by his trans-Atlantic flight, he embarked on an exhausting tour of the lower 48 states, in which he travelled 22,350 miles in three months, missing only one appearance date over that time.32 His biographer Leonard Mosely writes that Lindbergh embarked on the journey “less for the money than because he earnestly believed that showing himself and the Spirit to the people, and always arriving on time no matter what the weather, would prove to them that the air age had arrived and they should become a part of it.”33

At every stop, Lindbergh was greeted with enormous fanfare; it was estimated that 30 million people, or a quarter of the American population, went to see him at his

31 Ibid.
33 Ibid.
From the time of his trans-Atlantic voyage, American diplomats stationed abroad sought to make Lindbergh their guest of honour. This generosity was extended to him likely in part because said diplomats wanted to capitalize on Lindbergh’s popularity for the benefit of their own careers; however, whether or not it was the American officials’ primary intention, Lindbergh’s visits to foreign destinations had the effect of boosting America’s image abroad.

Before Lindbergh’s arrival in Paris, relations between France and America were at a downturn. In 1926, demonstrations against U.S. policies concerning war debt and foreign loans were staged in France. Additionally, many French blamed the American meteorological service for withholding information from pilots Charles Nungesser and François Coli, during their failed trans-Atlantic flight. This animosity soon disappeared after Lindbergh’s landing in Paris. He was greeted by massive crowds and unprecedented official honours; for example, “the [French] Foreign Office flew the American flag, the first time it had ever so saluted anyone not a head of state.”

American Ambassador to France Myron Herrick was quick to capitalize on this popularity, inviting Lindbergh to stay at the U.S. embassy and appearing with him at public celebrations. An American embassy official told Secretary of State Frank Kellogg that “Lindbergh’s personal popularity has been translated into popular enthusiasm for this country.” It was due in part to Lindbergh’s visit that France and America were able to resolve their tariff dispute a few months after his landing. Seeing the potential for Lindbergh as a goodwill ambassador for the U.S. State Department, Herrick encouraged

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36 Ibid, 181.
37 Cited in Ibid.
him to visit Belgium as well as Great Britain, where he was personally received by King George V.  

The first time Lindbergh was invited abroad by an American diplomat for the explicit purpose of improving America’s relations with the country to which he was visiting happened in December 1927, when U.S. Ambassador to Mexico Dwight Morrow invited Lindbergh to Mexico City as a gesture of America’s goodwill toward its neighbour to the south.  

Lindbergh had met Morrow at a reception at the White House after returning from Europe in June, and had dealt with him before when he sat on the board which managed the Fund for the Promotion of Aeronautics, which sponsored Lindbergh’s American tour. Lindbergh was glad to help Morrow in his efforts to improve diplomatic relations with Mexico, and even suggested that he fly from Washington to Mexico City to symbolize the unity between the two countries. However, one gets the impression from reading Lindbergh’s memoirs that the promotion of air travel was more important to him than aiding U.S. diplomacy. In the five pages in his memoirs, devoted to the Mexican trip, Lindbergh mentions foreign policy in just one sentence, while giving considerably more attention to his goal of connecting Latin America to the U.S. by air.

His other main reason for wanting to travel to Mexico was to use it as a starting point for a tour of Latin America. From late December to mid-February 1928, Lindbergh visited every country in Central America as well as various Caribbean nations. In most

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places, his visit was met with the biggest reception in that nation’s history.\textsuperscript{42} Lindbergh biographer A. Scott Berg notes that:

The press consistently applied the term “good will” to these Gulf-and-Caribbean flights, but as Lindbergh would later insist, “good will was a very welcome result, but it was not even a major element” in planning the flights. His interest lay primarily in “the adventure of flying, in demonstrating the airplane’s capabilities, and in the development of aviation in general.” He financed the trip himself.\textsuperscript{43}

Lindbergh’s subsequent flying expeditions, such as his flight to the Orient in 1931, and his Atlantic survey flight of 1933, which took him throughout Europe and western Africa,\textsuperscript{44} had the effects of helping the aviation industry by mapping new air routes and promoting air travel, and of promoting goodwill towards the American government. In a more general sense, however, his achievements also improved global perceptions of the American way of life. Around the world, people saw the U.S. as the epitomy of technological development, and the rapid spread of American economic and cultural influence was further quickened by Lindbergh’s trans-Atlantic flight. Frank Costigliola argues that in Europe in particular, “Americanization had two overlapping meanings: the spread eastward of Yankee influence and the modernization indigenous to both continents but more advanced in America.”\textsuperscript{45} For millions of people, Lindbergh was the poster child for technological advancement, and the State Department realized that by using him as a goodwill ambassador, America would improve its image abroad. This in turn improved American international relations economically and politically, which had the cyclical effect of increasing the rate of Americanization. As a supporter of

\textsuperscript{42} A. Scott Berg, \textit{Lindbergh}: 174.
\textsuperscript{43} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{44} This trip is described in detail in Anne Morrow Lindbergh, “Flying Around the North Atlantic,” \textit{National Geographic}, Vol. LXVI, No. 3, September 1934.
\textsuperscript{45} Frank Costigliola, \textit{Awkward Dominion}: 167-168.
technological expansion, Lindbergh had no problem with assisting the State Department in this endeavour.

His promotion of technology had strong economic ramifications. Forbes magazine wrote that:

Lindbergh’s significance to business seems greater than that of any merchant or financial magnate on either side of the Atlantic. ... Progressive bankers, merchants, manufacturers and the public generally, have forgotten that recently it was impossible to get letters of inquiry, money orders, or any other commercial papers across the continent in less time than a business week ... After Lindbergh we shall have transocean airmail.46

Lindbergh himself said that he thought aviation would become one of America’s biggest industries. As a world leader in air technology, the United States stood to gain enormously as a global economic power from the expansion of aviation. Many wealthy elites in America, such as Harry Guggenheim, Air Secretary F. Trubee Davison,47 and Dwight Morrow saw how Lindbergh’s agenda promoted their own economic interests and acted as key fundraisers for his travels.48 These men were also very influential in the Republican party which, by the late 1920s, was known as the pro-business party in America.49

The Republican candidate in the 1928 presidential elections was Secretary of Commerce Herbert Hoover, a strong believer in economic individualism. Historian Walter LaFeber argues that Hoover saw American prosperity as being closely linked to America’s place in the world order, and that “rather than retreating from the world, Hoover .. believed that he had to go out and restart the international economy so that

47 In addition to being Air Secretary, Davison’s father Henry was the senior managing partner at the J.P. Morgan and Company finance house.
48 A. Scott Berg, Lindbergh: 164.
49 Albert Fried, FDR and his Enemies. (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1999) 95.
In 1928, Lindbergh personally telegraphed Hoover to declare his support for his candidacy. His telegram did not go into specifics regarding America’s place in the world order. However, it is clear that Hoover’s views of American international economic expansion and Lindbergh’s promotion of aviation, an industry of great benefit to U.S. domestic and international business interests, put the two men on the same page in regards to foreign policy.

However, Hoover’s presidency was marked one of the greatest economic collapses in U.S. history, and he lost the 1932 election. His successor was Franklin Roosevelt, a man with whom Lindbergh would develop a bitter personal rivalry. It is unclear what Lindbergh’s reaction was to Roosevelt’s election, though likely Lindbergh was preoccupied with non-political matters at the time, as his first-born son had been kidnapped in March of that year.

The acrimonious relationship which developed between the two men was likely due in part to their differences as people. Roosevelt was from a wealthy, patrician background with deep connections to the political establishment; Lindbergh came from a Minnesota farm family, with a father who as a Progressive congressman, was known for his anti-establishment views. Additionally, Roosevelt was a master of concealing his true objectives; his Secretary of the Interior, Harold Ickes once told him “you are one of the most difficult men to work with that I have ever known … you won’t talk frankly even

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51 The specific text of the message was “The more I see of your campaign, the more strongly I feel that your election is of supreme importance to the country. Your qualities as a man and what you stand for, regardless of party, make me feel that the problems which will come before the country during the next four years will be best solved by your leadership” (Cited in Mosely, 135).
52 It is worth noting that Lindbergh voted for Hoover in the 1932 presidential election, for Wendell Wilkie in 1940, and for Thomas Dewey in 1944 (Cole, 127).
with people who are loyal to you." In so doing, Roosevelt hoped to appeal to a mass audience, thereby gaining increased support for his leadership and his policy agenda. Conversely, Lindbergh disliked crowds, resented deeply the media’s invasion of his privacy, and against the advice of his friends, did not shy away from speaking his mind on highly controversial subjects. In a letter to his friend William Castle, he said that he wrote his speeches “without an attempt to gain popularity and with the feeling that it is desirable for someone to speak frankly and as he actually feels.”

However, as late as April 1939, Lindbergh wrote in his journal after a meeting with Roosevelt that he liked the president, and thought he could get along with him. Though Lindbergh criticized Roosevelt for being “mostly politician,” Lindbergh wrote that “there are things about [Roosevelt] I like, and why worry about the others unless and until they necessitate consideration? It is better to work together as long as we can; yet somehow I have a feeling that it may not be for long.”

The ultimate reason for the two men’s falling out was their different perceptions of America’s role in the global order. Since colonial times, most American leaders have expressed a view on this subject, with most arguing in favour of America developing itself into a world empire. In 1630, Puritan leader John Winthrop told his followers that

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55 Albert Fried, FDR and his Enemies: 99.
57 Cited in Ibid, 145.
59 Ibid.
60 In Lloyd Gardner, Walter LaFeber, and Thomas McCormick, Creation of the American Empire: U.S. Diplomatic History. (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1973) 1, the authors write that “[f]rom 1776 until the 1970s [when the book was published] Americans have attempted to increase their prosperity by using their diplomacy to obtain empire.
New England should be a “Citty Upon a Hill,” 61 destined to provide a model society and
government for the rest of the world. It has been argued that “this sense of destiny, so
eloquently expressed by Winthrop at the dawn of the New World’s history, infused and
shaped the perception that Americans have ever since had of themselves and their role in
the world…” 62

However, the means by which Americans have carried out Winthrop’s mission
have varied. Until the mid-nineteenth century, the American empire was primarily
economic. 63 Around that time, America began to develop a military which would rank
among the world’s best by the end of the century. 64 With the development of a world-
class armed forces, American leaders such as Theodore Roosevelt sought to involve
America in foreign wars, to expand American trade and business interests, and to
increase their country’s territorial holdings.

Lindbergh supported certain aspects of both forms of American foreign policy.
However, though he was in favour of America increasing its economic ties with the rest
of the world, his main reason for taking this position was more because he thought that
the world would benefit from access to American technological products, than because he
sought to make the U.S. wealthy at the expense of less developed nations. It should also
be noted that although Lindbergh believed America should improve its military, 65 and
even though he opposed decolonization, 66 he did not want the U.S. to engage in wars of

Diplomatic History: 4.
63 Ibid, 1.
64 Ibid.
65 Wayne Cole, Charles A. Lindbergh and the Battle Against American Intervention in World War II: 89.
conquest or expansion. He was opposed to American participation in foreign wars partly because he did not think it was the role of the U.S. to tell the rest of the world how to live, and also because he feared the incredibly destructive impact of modern weaponry on human development. In a speech in August 1941, he asked, “shall we now give up the independence we have won, and crusade abroad in a utopian attempt to force our ideas on the rest of the world; or shall we use air power, and other advances of modern warfare, to guard and strengthen the independence of our nation?”

Lindbergh’s personal mission, and the endeavour which he thought America should pursue in its foreign policy, was the promotion of human development, in the fields of technology, human genetics, and culture. His means of promoting progress were multiple; he was directly involved in developing air technology and in designing other innovations, he married and fathered six children with a woman who had, in his opinion, a good genetic background, and he and Mrs. Lindbergh travelled the world learning and writing about other peoples and ways of life. Less directly, he was an unofficial ambassador for the United States, the country which, in his mind, was the epitomy of progress. By promoting American research and development, diplomacy and international trade, Lindbergh believed that he was promoting human development. In other words, he thought that America should be a world power to further the cause of human advancement.

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67 Ibid.
69 In this regard, Lindbergh’s view of “progress” has been soundly rejected by modern society, based on an improved understanding of medical science and anthropology and, in this author’s opinion, a better-developed ethos regarding people of other races.
It is far more difficult to understand and to summarize Franklin Roosevelt’s opinions on foreign policy, because as mentioned earlier, Roosevelt seldom, if ever, openly discussed his opinions. Various schools of thought exist concerning Roosevelt’s foreign policy agenda. Some have argued that he was an isolationist who was forced into World War II after the Japanese attack at Pearl Harbor;70 supporters of this theory point to Roosevelt’s support for isolationism during his first term in particular,71 and to the 1940 election campaign, in which he promised not to draw the U.S. into any foreign wars.72 Others have postulated that, in keeping with Gardner, LaFeber and McCormick’s argument that America has constantly sought to become an empire, Roosevelt tried to accomplish this end by involving America in a war in which its principal enemies, in his opinion Germany and Japan, would be destroyed, and its principal rivals on the European continent would be fragmented.73 Various other theories, and variations of the above schools, have been developed, but the general consensus is that Roosevelt’s end goal in foreign policymaking was to make the U.S. an economic and military superpower. Ideals which Lindbergh held dear, such as developing technology and genetics, preventing the destructiveness of war, and stopping the expansion of communism were less important to Roosevelt than was the creation of a world order in which America was the single greatest power.

70 Paul Boyer et al., The Enduring Vision: A History of the American People. (Boston: Houghton-Mifflin Company, 2002) 546. To quote this source, “[c]ritics have accused Roosevelt of luring the Japanese into attacking Pearl Harbor in order to bring the United States into the war against Germany. There is no documentary evidence to support this accusation.”
71 Nathan Miller, FDR: An Intimate History. (New York: New American Library: 1983) 422. On this page, Miller writes “Roosevelt pursued a foreign policy that mirrored the isolationist mood of the country during his first years in the White House.”
72 Nathan Miller, FDR: An Intimate History: 457.
73 The “fragmentation” argument is developed at length in John Harper, American Visions of Europe. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994).
After moving his family to Britain in 1935, Lindbergh developed an increased interest in national and international politics. In his analysis of the British people and government, he described both as “slow, inefficient and complacent,” an opinion which, it seems, was derived largely from British attitudes toward technology. While living in Britain, Lindbergh had problems receiving quality equipment for his scientific experiments, took issue with “casual English driving habits,” and criticized British Airways’ low standards for punctuality. Seemingly based on his frustrations with British technology, he wondered in a much more general sense if the British were “simply attempting to make others believe that British is always best, or if they actually believed it themselves. … If the first is the fact, then they have admirable ability. But if the latter is the case it is an alarming condition.”

He compared the British to the Germans, who he saw as more efficient, harder working and more technologically developed. In his memoirs, he writes that during his first trip to Germany in 1936:

The organized vitality … was what most impressed me: the unceasing activity of the people, and the convinced dictatorial direction to create the new factories, airfields, and research laboratories. … It was such a contrast to the complacent and tranquil life in England from which we had come. Germany had the ambitious drive of America, but that drive was headed for war.

As he did with Britain, Lindbergh based his view of Germany, as a whole, largely upon a technological analysis, in a direct and indirect sense. Directly, he admired the research and development which was taking place in Adolf Hitler’s Third Reich, and indirectly, he

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75 Ibid.
76 Ibid, 26-27.
respected the machine-like way in which, according to his own perceptions, an efficient, well-managed people had rebuilt their nation after being defeated in World War I.

Lindbergh said in early 1936 that he understood how someone like Hitler came to power, given the conditions in Germany in the early 1930s, and that he thought that Der Fuhrer had “done much for the German people.” However, Lindbergh also commented that Hitler was a “fanatic,” and that he hoped that moderation would prevail in Germany in due course. He thought that Germany could be encouraged to become less radical with the proper encouragement from America, Britain and France. Alfred Fried argues that “the fundamental question [Lindbergh] posed to whoever would listen was this: how could the Western democracies help Hitler’s Germany, with all her faults, become a force for good in the world?”

Lindbergh did not support Nazism, and he thought that “the ideology, the regimentation, the intolerance, and the fanaticism of Hitler’s Third Reich were intolerable in comparison to alternatives that existed.” Though he was notorious for not speaking out against the Nazis’ human rights violations, he did not support or even understand the regime’s anti-Semitism, which he saw as irrational. And after the war, while touring

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78 A. Scott Berg, *Lindbergh*: 382. On this page, Berg quotes Lindbergh as saying that “I shared the repulsion that the democratic peoples felt in viewing the demagoguery of Hitler, the controlled elections, the secret police. Yet I felt that I was seeing in Germany, despite the crudeness of its form, the inevitable alternative to decline – a challenge based on the drive to achieve success despite established ‘right’ and ‘law.’” Berg notes that “rather than look at the price being paid for that ‘success,’ Lindbergh buried his head in the sand when confronted with the crimes of inhumanity that repelled many others.”
80 Ibid.
81 Albert Fried, *FDR and his Enemies*: 175.
84 Albert Fried, *FDR and his Enemies*: 182.
the Nazi death camps, he was disgusted and angered by the Final Solution. Ultimately, he concluded that Hitler epitomized “the abortive relationship between human values and mechanical perfection,” while Lindbergh admired the technological progress achieved under the Third Reich, he opposed the Nazis’ destructive, irrational agenda, which he saw as rooted in human passion and emotion rather than in the scientific values of logic and calculation.

So how did Lindbergh propose that America deal with the Nazis? Firstly, he suggested that America and Western Europe improve their air defences, in light of the impressive technological advances made by the German Luftwaffe. His first visit to Germany in 1936 came after the U.S. military attaché in Germany, Major Truman Smith, invited Lindbergh to inspect the German air force, for the purpose of providing intelligence information to the American government. Smith invited Lindbergh to Germany again in 1937, again to inspect and document German air power. During this trip, the two men authored a report entitled “General Estimate,” which argued that German air power was superior to France’s, that it would rapidly surpass Great Britain’s, and that “Germany should obtain technical parity with the USA by 1941 or 1942.”

To defend against foreign aggression, Lindbergh recommended that the U.S. make improvements to its air defence network. Addressing the House Committee on

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85 Charles Lindbergh, *Autobiography of Values*: 345-350. In a rather stream of consciousness manner, Lindbergh details his visit immediately after World War II to a Nazi concentration camp, and his reactions to the horrific scene.
86 Ibid, 350.
87 Wayne Cole, *Charles A. Lindbergh and the Battle Against American Intervention in World War II*: 36-37. It should be noted that during these visits, the German Air Ministry fed Lindbergh and Smith information which grossly exaggerated the size of the German air force. In “General Estimate,” the two men estimated Germany was producing 800 planes per month, with 10,000 already built. However, in an estimate made by Leonard Mosely based on an examination of German archives, in 1940 (more than two years after Lindbergh and Smith’s report came out), the Luftwaffe had only “1,711 bombers, 424 dive bombers, 354 escort fighters, 1,356 pursuit planes and 830 reconnaissance and other planes” (cited in Fried, 178).
Foreign Affairs in January 1941, he argued that America should construct air bases in “Newfoundland, Canada, the West Indies, parts of South America, Central America, the Galapagos Islands, the Hawaiian Islands, and Alaska.”\(^88\) He suggested that the U.S. build a moderate number of airplanes, with priority given to the construction of long-range bombers and defensive pursuit planes.\(^89\) Lindbergh did not think that an air invasion from the Eastern Hemisphere was possible, given the lack of technology available to carry out such a mission, and the necessity for an air attack to be coupled with a ground invasion. Though he thought that America was poorly prepared for war, he also said in April 1941 that “even in our present condition of unpreparedness, no foreign power is in a position to invade us today. If we concentrate on our own and build the strength that this nation should maintain, no foreign army will ever attempt to land on American shores.”\(^90\)

Though he thought that America should be militarily prepared for a war with Germany, Lindbergh never saw the Germans as a major threat. Before World War II, he thought that it was highly unlikely that Germany would attack Britain or France,\(^91\) and even after the outbreak of war, he argued that America had little to fear from Hitler’s forces.\(^92\) Rather, he feared Joseph Stalin’s Soviet Union, which had, in Lindbergh’s opinion, a culture and political system which would, if given the chance, radically alter Western civilization. He thought that war with the Soviets was inevitable,\(^93\) and his greatest hope lay in the possibility that a war would be confined to fighting between Hitler and Stalin. It seemed probable that Germany would be victorious.

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\(^{88}\) Cited in Wayne Cole, *Charles A. Lindbergh and the Battle Against American Intervention in World War II*: 89.  
\(^{89}\) Ibid, 90.  
\(^{90}\) Charles Lindbergh, “New York City Speech,” April 23, 1941.  
\(^{91}\) Wayne Cole, *Charles A. Lindbergh and the Battle Against American Intervention in World War II*: 34.  
in such a conflict; and by that time France and England would be stronger. Under any circumstances, I believed that a victory by Germany’s European people would be preferable to one by Russia’s semi-Asiatic Soviet Union. Hitler would not live forever, and I felt sure the Germans would eventually moderate the excesses of his Nazi regime.94

As such, Lindbergh’s second suggested way of preventing Germany from going to war with America was for the U.S. to improve its diplomatic relations with the Third Reich. Such a move would not only would prevent Germany and America from fighting, but it would also limit Soviet expansion. In October 1938, he readily accepted an invitation from U.S. Ambassador to Germany Hugh Wilson to a dinner party at the American embassy, at which Lindbergh and Field Marshal Herman Göring were to be the guests of honour. Wilson hosted the dinner in an attempt to improve American-German relations, a turn of events which seemed possible after the Munich Conference two weeks earlier, at which France and Britain opted for a policy of appeasement.95 At the dinner, without the permission of Wilson, Göring presented Lindbergh with a medal, on behalf of Adolf Hitler. Though Lindbergh was viciously condemned in later years for accepting the award, Wayne Cole argues that even if the Americans had advance notice about the medal presentation:

They probably would not have changed their conduct significantly. To have refused the medal in that setting would have embarassed America’s Ambassador, offended [Göring] and worsened German-American relations at a moment when they showed a possibility of improvement.96

In addition to expressing support for the Third Reich through diplomatic channels, Lindbergh also wanted the U.S., as well as France and Britain, to strengthen their economic and political ties with Germany. In September 1938, Lindbergh suggested that

94 Cited in A. Scott Berg, Lindbergh: 382.
95 Wayne Cole, Charles A. Lindbergh and the Battle Against American Intervention in World War II: 41.
96 Ibid, 42.
France purchase bombers from Germany, assuming that Hitler might “welcome the opportunity to protect his western frontier.” Proposals such as this show how Lindbergh did not consider Nazi Germany a major threat, and how he thought that America could improve relations with Hitler’s government.

Roosevelt, on the other hand, saw Germany as a greater menace than the Soviet Union and thought that America could not and should not achieve peace with Hitler. By massively increasing defence spending from 1938 onwards, by allowing Allied powers to buy arms on a cash-and-carry basis, and by pushing for the implementation of the lend-lease agreement in early 1941, Roosevelt made it clear that he wanted America to oppose Germany in World War II. Additionally, by telling America that “even a neutral cannot be asked to close his mind or conscience,” in reference to the German invasion of Poland, Roosevelt was foreshadowing the eventual full-scale participation of America in the war in Europe.

Because of Roosevelt’s adamant refusal to side with Nazi Germany in World War II, Lindbergh was forced to change his own foreign policy message. Realizing the difficulty in convincing the American leadership to appease Hitler, Lindbergh went into a defensive mode, arguing that because the war had the potential to destroy Western civilization, America was best served by staying out of the conflict. After Germany invaded Poland in 1939, Lindbergh resigned his position as a colonel in the U.S. Air Corps to campaign, as a private citizen, against American involvement in the Second

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97 Cited in A. Scott Berg, Lindbergh: 376. This suggestion was made as a counter-proposal to the Canadian Plan favoured by Roosevelt, which would see American airplane manufacturers set up branch plants in Canada to produce bombers for France, thereby bypassing American neutrality laws.


100 Ibid, 541.
World War. In April 1941, he joined an organization called America First, which promoted American non-alignment, and he remained involved with isolationist activities until America joined the war after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in December 1941.

Lindbergh’s reasons for wanting to keep America out of World War II were tied to his technical worldview. He feared that the war would destroy centuries of human genetic development on the battlefields. Seeing the British, French and Germans as racial brethren, Lindbergh described the conflict as fratricidal, and argued that the future of the white race at being at risk. Should America enter the war, Lindbergh predicted that up to 1,000,000 American lives would be lost. Such a sacrifice was needless, in his opinion, given the fact that the U.S. could easily defend itself.

He also opposed the economic destruction that the war could cause, both in Europe and in the U.S. After the war, Lindbergh attributed the destruction of the British and French colonial empires to the weakened positions of those two countries after being forced to reconstruct war damage for the second time in less than 30 years. In his famous Des Moines speech of September 1941, he also warned against the economic hardship America might endure should it, saying that:

We were left with the debts of the last European war; and unless we are more cautious in the future than we have been in the past, we will be left with the debts of the present case. If it were not for her hope that she can make us responsible for the war financially, as well as militarily, I believe England would have negotiated a peace in Europe many months ago, and be better off for doing so.

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Though Lindbergh said in this speech that he liked the British people, he had little sympathy for their leadership, saying that Britain had been unrealistic in promising military support for Poland, to fight against a regime which had handily defeated several countries. America, he argued, should not take responsibility for bailing Britain out of a conflict into which it never should have involved itself.\textsuperscript{106} Furthermore, as he stated in his first America First address, even if the U.S. intervened to help Britain, Germany’s military forces could easily repel an insufficiently armed American contingent, which would be unable to land troops and planes in the British Isles.\textsuperscript{107} This opinion was based largely on his gross overestimate of German military power, as described earlier.

Lindbergh listed the British as one of the three main groups lobbying for American intervention, groups which, he argued, must be opposed by the American people. He said that the second interventionist group was American Jews, a people whose hostility towards Nazi Germany was understandable, but whose agenda must be resisted. He told the crowd in Des Moines that “we cannot blame [the Jews] for looking out for what they believe to be their own interests, but we also must look out for ours. We cannot allow the natural passions and prejudices of other peoples to lead our country to destruction.”\textsuperscript{108} Lindbergh went on to warn the world Jewish community that their support for American intervention was self-destructive, as they would be “among the first [ethnic groups] to feel its consequences,”\textsuperscript{109} and that their support for the war was undemocratic.

\textsuperscript{106} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{107} Charles Lindbergh, “New York City Speech,” April 24, 1941.
\textsuperscript{109} Ibid.
While he had said little about democracy before the war, and had at times been highly conciliatory towards undemocratic governments, democracy was a major theme of Lindbergh’s wartime speeches. However, it should be noted that he did not think that America could or should impose democracy on other countries, and he focused his critique of the decline in democracy on the American government, and in particular, on the Roosevelt administration. The White House was the third group Lindbergh said was promoting intervention, and he blasted Roosevelt’s efforts to help Britain and France, saying that a large majority of the U.S. people opposed American involvement. He claimed that the president’s real reasons for wanting to join the war were political; namely, he wanted to extend his constitutional powers, to run for an unprecedented third term in office, and to follow up on an earlier, politically-motivated pledge to help Britain. Lindbergh went so far as to say that Congress and the Senate were the only democratic institutions left in the American government.

Such bitter condemnation of Roosevelt was sure to provoke a response, and as Cole writes, “when either [Roosevelt or Lindbergh] invaded the domain of the other … the result was a battle of the giants.” Roosevelt’s Secretary of the Interior, Harold Ickes, repeatedly referred to Lindbergh as a Nazi in speeches, and, as mentioned

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113 Ibid.
115 Ibid, 130. In one such speech on July 14, 1941, Ickes slammed Lindbergh for accepting Göring’s medal in 1938. Though Lindbergh had hitherto ignored Ickes’s smear campaign, he was prompted in this case to write to Roosevelt on July 16, telling him that the medal was received “in the presence of your Ambassador,” and that he “was there at [the Ambassador’s request in order to assist in creating a better relationship between the American embassy and the German government.” Lindbergh demanded an apology from Roosevelt, which did not happen.
previously, the president himself called Lindbergh a “copperhead.”\textsuperscript{116} Such public criticisms were powerful weapons for interventionists to use in discrediting Lindbergh and his supporters.\textsuperscript{117} In private, Roosevelt was even more harsh in his criticism of Lindbergh, telling his Secretary of the Treasury Henry Morgenthau in May 1940 that “if I should die tomorrow, I want you to know this. I am absolutely convinced that Lindbergh is a Nazi.”\textsuperscript{118}

In addition to condemning Lindbergh directly or through men like Ickes, Roosevelt used his political forces, such as the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), to try to discredit Lindbergh. The FBI started a file on him in 1939, after he spoke out in favour of isolationism, and in May and June 1940, the White House forwarded letters it had received from writers supporting Lindbergh to the Bureau. FBI director J. Edgar Hoover had his staff investigate the senders of the letters, looking for derogatory information. The next year, the Bureau investigated a claim that Lindbergh had secretly given military aircraft designs to Nazi Germany when he worked for the Air Corps; even after the Justice Department told the FBI to stop investigating due to a lack of evidence, Hoover authorized the investigation to continue for another three months. On Roosevelt’s orders, the Bureau also examined a false accusation that Lindbergh had leaked secret War Department information to the isolationist media. Moreover, the FBI collected information “on Lindbergh’s personal life that had no other purpose than to

\textsuperscript{116} Cited in Ibid, 131.
\textsuperscript{117} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{118} Cited in Ibid, 128.
discredit his moral character (Lindbergh had previously had a reputation as a decent, moral man).”

Even after Lindbergh offered to join the war effort after the Pearl Harbor attack, Roosevelt refused to let him serve in the armed forces. Though Lindbergh worked as a technical advisor for Ford, for the United Aircraft Corporation, and for the U.S. Air Force (in 1944 – 1945), his position with the Air Force was not officially restored until 1954, when President Dwight Eisenhower gave Lindbergh the title of brigadier-general.

After his trans-Atlantic flight, Charles Lindbergh gained a virtually unparalleled level of freedom. He gained access to the most powerful people on earth, and the world’s elites wanted access to him. He had the options of earning enough money from endorsements and lecturing to retire within a year or two, of being one of the most popular movie stars ever to grace the screens, or of making a run for the U.S. presidency.

With all of these options, Lindbergh decided to remain in aviation. As a technical advisor and pilot, he could travel, invent, and promote technological development, thereby helping to satisfy his insatiable curiosity. Lindbergh saw technology as being vital to improving the human condition, and he felt that the best way to achieve prosperity in the world was to raise living standards and to develop connections between peoples. For Lindbergh, development, in a scientific, genetic and cultural sense, was the key to achieving peace. However, he also realized that human, technological, and environmental destruction had far-reaching effects, and he believed that instruments of destruction, such as war, should be avoided at virtually all costs. He saw Western

civilization as the most advanced on earth, and attributed its success to the fact that its people, namely Caucasians, were the most technologically adept race. Of the Western nations, he believed that the United States possessed the best traits of the various European cultures, and he saw America as a world leader, both scientifically and politically.

From the time of his trans-Atlantic flight until he moved to Great Britain in 1935, Lindbergh’s opinions on American foreign policy were largely confined to his own area of expertise, aviation. Throughout the late 1920s and early 1930s, he travelled throughout the Americas, Europe and parts of the Orient and Africa promoting aviation and assisting American air companies to expand their sales and services abroad. As such, he thought that American foreign policy should be internationalist in its orientation, and supported Herbert Hoover in the 1928 election, after the presidential candidate had proclaimed his support for American economic internationalism.

Officials in the American government believed that Lindbergh could be useful in another sense; namely, as a goodwill ambassador for the United States. Diplomats such as Myron Herrick in France and Dwight Morrow in Mexico, to name but two, used Lindbergh’s visits to improve diplomatic relations between America and the country in which they were posted. Additionally, the State Department saw Lindbergh as being vitally important in its promotion of American culture abroad, which in turn, helped improve America’s political and economic relations with the rest of the world. Finally, the wealthy corporate supporters of the U.S. government realized the value of Lindbergh’s work to American trade and commerce, and contributed extensive funding to his travels.
During the Coolidge and Hoover administrations, Lindbergh’s relations with the American government were generally good. This would change after Franklin Roosevelt took office, particularly after the outbreak of World War II. Though Lindbergh and Roosevelt had very different backgrounds and personalities, the main reason for their eventual hatred of one another was their profoundly different views concerning America’s place in the world order.

After moving to Britain in 1935, Lindbergh expanded his areas of interest within the realm of foreign affairs beyond aviation. From the mid-1930s to December 1941, Lindbergh articulated a vision of an American foreign policy which coincided in part with the antebellum-era view that America should be a major economic power, and with the position expounded by Theodore Roosevelt and others that the U.S. should be a military leader. However, Lindbergh did not support economic and military expansion for the purpose of conquest, and saw America’s role in the world as being to promote the technological, genetic and cultural development of humanity. This position fundamentally contradicted Franklin Roosevelt’s view of American foreign relations as serving the purpose of expanding the power and influence of the U.S., at the expense of other nations.

Lindbergh analysed countries from a very technical viewpoint; specifically, he judged nations according to their levels of technological development, their attitudes toward technology, and the level to which their societies operated according to mechanical ideals such as efficiency and quality. For this reason, he admired the way in which Adolf Hitler’s Third Reich and the German people had transformed their country from an economic failure to a smoothly-operating world power. While he did not support
the Nazi ideology, which he saw as largely contradictory to the technological values he
held dear, he thought that America’s best way of dealing with the Third Reich was to
improve the American military capacity, and to pursue diplomatic and economic relations
with the Nazis. Lindbergh believed that the Soviet Union was a far greater threat to
Western civilization than was Nazi Germany, and he hoped that, in the likely event of a
Soviet attack on Europe, the war would be confined to Germany, that Hitler’s forces
would win, and that in time, a more moderate government would take power in Germany.

However, despite his best efforts to work with the American government,
Lindbergh’s foreign policy views were incompatible with Roosevelt’s. After the
outbreak of World War II, Lindbergh focused his attention on keeping America out of the
conflict. His reasons for taking this position were multiple: he saw the war in Europe as
fratricidal, with enormous consequences for the future of the Caucasian race; he believed
that the conflict would cause extensive economic damage around the world; he did not
think that the U.S. could defeat Germany; and he thought that it was undemocratic for
Roosevelt to bring his country into the war against the will of a majority of Americans,
for the sake of pleasing special interest groups (namely, the Jewish lobby) and of
extending his “dictatorial” powers. Roosevelt responded to Lindbergh’s opposition by
slandering him and his movement, and by having the FBI spend considerable resources
amassing a file on Lindbergh for the main purpose of destroying his image and
credibility. The president’s bitterness toward Lindbergh extended into the war, when
Roosevelt had his cabinet ministers block Lindbergh from joining the U.S. Air Force.

It does not appear that Lindbergh ever regretted opposing Roosevelt on the issue
of American foreign policy. In fact, it could be argued that Lindbergh’s falling out with
the president, which caused Lindbergh’s personal popularity to plummet, was for him a blessing in disguise. While Lindbergh enjoyed the influence and the connections which came with his fame, he never liked dealing with the masses of fans and paparazzi who invaded his privacy. After his popularity was diminished, Lindbergh and his family were able to live in America relatively free from harassment. In the end, Charles Lindbergh became a man who lived according to his foreign policy ideals of development for the purpose of furthering peace, as he was able to continue developing his ideas and beliefs and was able to the rest of his life in relative peace.